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INTRODUCTION
The recent investigations of local police officers for the deaths of unarmed
civilians in Ferguson, Missouri and Staten Island, New York, fueled public outrage
about the lack of transparency of grand jury proceedings.1 In Ferguson, St. Louis
County Prosecutor Robert McCullough took the highly unusual step, after the grand
jury issued a “no bill,” of releasing portions of grand jury transcripts.2 But during the
investigation and deliberations themselves, both grand jury proceedings were kept
secret pursuant to the time-honored and accepted tradition of shielding grand jurors
from improper influence.3 Even one of the witnesses in the Missouri case hired by
the victim’s family—pathologist Michael Baden—was prevented from talking to the
media about the substance of his grand jury testimony during that inquiry.4

* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Rappaport Center for Law and Public Policy,
Boston College Law School. I am grateful to my colleagues Jeffrey Cohen, Judith McMorrow,
Mary Ann Neary, David Olson, and Robert Ullmann for their invaluable comments, and to my
students Nathan Roberts (J.D. ’15) and Kathryn Ball (J.D. ’17) for their extremely helpful
research and editorial assistance.
1. Editorial, Michael Brown, Eric Garner: Why Killings by Police Cause Public
Suspicions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2014, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/editorials
/ct-eric-garner-michael-brown-police-kill-edit-1205-jm-20141204-story.html [https://perma
.cc/D7TV-JBFD]; Jennifer Peltz, After Killings by Police, A Debate Over Grand Jury Secrecy,
DENVER POST (Jan. 28, 2015, 8:23 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/environment
/ci_27409802/?source=infinite-up [https://perma.cc/D9HJ-6MRY].
2. Benjamin Weiser, Mixed Motives Seen in Prosecutor’s Decision to Release Ferguson
Grand Jury Materials, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11
/26/us/mixed-motives-seen-in-prosecutors-decision-to-release-ferguson-grand-jury-materials.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/9DNK-5955].
3. See Richard M. Calkins, Grand Jury Secrecy, 63 MICH. L. REV. 455, 456 (1965). In
contrast to the Ferguson, Missouri case, a New York Supreme Court justice refused a petition
by the New York Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP to release grand jury transcripts in
the investigation into the death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, citing the strong presumption
in favor of grand jury secrecy and the “chilling effect” that a release of transcripts would have
on witnesses before such a tribunal. James v. Donovan, 130 A.D.3d 1032, 1039 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2015). For the New York Civil Liberties Union’s arguments, see Brief of
Petitioner-Appellant at 15–18, James v. Donovan, 130 A.D.3d 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015)
(No. 2015-02774).
4. Stephanie Lecci, Grand Jury Hears Testimony from Brown Family Pathologist, ST.
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Missouri is one of a small number of states that expressly prevent grand jury
witnesses from disclosing their testimony to the press or to other witnesses.5 But in
New York, as well as in the majority of other states and the federal system,
obligations of grand jury secrecy do not extend to grand jury witnesses.6 In these
jurisdictions, only persons performing an “official function” before the grand jury
are covered by the oath of secrecy.7 Absent a contract or court order, witnesses are
free to talk with each other or with the press. Nevertheless, prosecutors often seek to
handcuff grand jury witnesses in their exercise of First Amendment rights by drafting
one-sided cooperation agreements or immunity orders that impose obligations of
secrecy on grand jury witnesses, even though none exist under governing statutes or
rules of criminal procedure.
This Article addresses one crucial aspect of the ongoing debate about grand jury
transparency.8 Assuming that well over half the states and the federal government

LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Nov. 13, 2014), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/grand-jury-hears
-testimony-brown-family-pathologist [https://perma.cc/AQ55-UURR].
5. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 540.110 (West 2002) (providing that the foreperson shall be
authorized to administer the following oath to every witness that appears before the grand jury:
“Do you further solemnly swear, or affirm, that you will not after your examination here,
directly or indirectly, divulge or make known to any person or persons the fact that this grand
jury has or has had under consideration the matters concerning which you shall be examined,
or any other fact or thing which may come to your knowledge while before this body, or
concerning which you shall here testify, unless lawfully required to testify in relation
thereto?”). See also SARA SUN BEALE, WILLIAM C. BRYSON, JAMES E. FELMAN, MICHAEL J.
ELSTON & KATHERINE EARLE YANES, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.5, Westlaw
(database updated Nov. 2015) (describing twelve states impose obligation of secrecy on grand
jury witnesses).
6. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5 n.23. While twelve states include witnesses
before the grand jury in the obligation of secrecy, most states that do so typically provide an
express exception for communications between the witness and their counsel. Id. § 5.5 n.22.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
7. Traditional justifications for grand jury secrecy include protecting the witnesses or
jurors from intimidation, safeguarding the putative target from injury to reputation should he
not be indicted, and preventing flight, obstruction of justice, or the subornation of perjury.
United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424 (1983).
8. See, e.g., Paul Cassell, Achieving Transparency for the Grand Jury’s Decision on the
Michael Brown Shooting, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/19/achieving-transparency
-for-the-grand-jurys-decision-on-the-michael-brown-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/63YC-K6F6];
Chris Dolmetsch, N.Y. Police Evidence Request Furthers Grand Jury Debate, BLOOMBERG
BUS. (Dec. 12, 2014, 11:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12
-12/grand-jury-evidence-in-nypd-killing-sought-by-official [https://perma.cc/A32K-TA53];
Kristine Guerra & Jill Disis, Was Shooting Self-Defense or Manslaughter? Case Reflects
Debate over Grand Juries, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Jan. 2, 2015, 11:12 AM),
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2015/01/02/self-defense-shooting-case-illustrates
-debate-grand-juries/21102797/ [https://perma.cc/LNT3-HLUW]; Peltz, supra note 1; R.W.,
How a Grand Jury Works, THE ECONOMIST: THE ECONOMIST EXPLAINS (Dec. 7, 2014, 11:50
PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/12/economist-explains-3
[https://perma.cc/FTR3-3ABF].
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continue to employ the grand jury to investigate felony offenses, 9 and assuming that
these proceedings continue to be shielded from public view,10 should witnesses
themselves be allowed to discuss their testimony with the press or with each other?
This larger question raises two narrow but very important subsidiary issues. First,
does a prosecutor who conditions a written proffer or cooperation agreement with a
grand jury witness on the witness’s promise not to inform other targets, subjects, or
witnesses about what information he provided to the government violate Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.4(f)11 by impeding another party’s access to information
in litigation? Second, does a judge who issues a grant of judicial immunity under 18
U.S.C. § 600312 or its state analogue and includes an order prohibiting the grand jury
witness from talking to any other potential witnesses or to the media about the subject
matter of the government’s investigation exceed his or her authority under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)?13 Both of these scenarios implicate not only the
public interest in being informed about governmental affairs, but also the ability of
putative targets of an investigation to work together to gather, preserve, and submit
potentially exculpatory information that may help influence the grand jury not to
indict, or to indict for a lesser offense. In this Article, I will argue that efforts by
prosecutors and judges to impose extrastatutory secrecy obligations on grand jury
witnesses undermine the independence of the grand jury, and thwart its proper
screening function.14

9. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 1.7. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia
continue to use grand juries, although these jurisdictions differ in exactly how they are utilized.
In nineteen states grand jury indictment is required for all felonies, in four states it is required
only for particularly serious named felonies such as murder, and in twenty-five states (so called
“information” states) the prosecutor may elect to charge by either grand jury indictment or
information. See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy
in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 19 & nn.85–87 (2002). Connecticut has
abandoned the use of the grand jury altogether for criminal cases, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-47(b)–(e) (2009), and in Pennsylvania the government may only petition the court to
convene a grand jury in special circumstances. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4543 (West
2004).
10. Calkins, supra note 3, at 458–59; see Editorial, A Judge’s Idea for Grand Jury Reform,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/a-judges-idea-for
-grand-jury-reform.html?_r=2 [https://perma.cc/WNA3-GHVZ]; James Queally, Grand
Juries Are ‘Relic of Another Time’: New York’s Top Judge Urges Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
17, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-ny-grand-jury-reform-20150217
-story.html [https://perma.cc/LYE9-NVFA].
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (1983).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2012).
13. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).
14. See generally United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 430 (1983) (describing
the relationship between prosecutor and grand jury); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686–88
(1972) (describing the purposes and powers of a grand jury).
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I. SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
It is generally conceded that at the grand jury phase of a criminal proceeding, the
prosecutor is the writer, director, producer, and star of her own show.15 Prosecutors
try to control the flow of information to and from the grand jury in order to reduce
the risk of target flight, witness tampering, and the destruction of evidence. These
are legitimate concerns that are reflected in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
pertaining to grand jury secrecy.16 Yet “secrecy” is sometimes an overstated, if not
talismanic, justification for excessive prosecutorial control. Prosecutors routinely try
to inhibit the dissemination of information about the grand jury’s inquiry because it
gives them the tactical advantage of surprise when examining witnesses, it
contributes to the power of the prosecutor to catch witnesses in the “perjury trap”
and thereby secure their cooperation,17 and it makes it difficult for witnesses who
share common interests to work together to prepare their defense.
In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest,18 the Supreme Court identified five
specific interests advanced by keeping grand jury proceedings secret.
First, if preindictment proceedings were made public, many prospective
witnesses would be hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that
those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony.
Moreover, witnesses who appeared before the grand jury would be less
likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as
well as to inducements. There also would be the risk that those about to
be indicted would flee, or would try to influence individual grand jurors
to vote against indictment. Finally, by preserving the secrecy of the
proceedings, we assure that persons who are accused but exonerated by
the grand jury will not be held up to public ridicule.19
The Court ruled that civil litigants seeking to gain access to the transcripts of grand
jury proceedings in related criminal litigation must show a particularized need for
disclosure that outweighs these strong public interests.20
In most jurisdictions, witnesses are not persons who perform an “official
function” before the grand jury, and therefore, they are under no express obligation
to maintain confidentiality under applicable statutes or rules of criminal procedure.21

15. See Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2004); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot)
Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 305 (1995).
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B) (“Unless these rules provide otherwise, the following
persons must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury . . . .”).
17. Jessica Fischweicher, Perjury, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799, 820 (2008).
18. 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
19. Id. at 219.
20. Id. at 223–24.
21. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); BEALE, ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5. For example, in
the Eric Garner death investigation in Staten Island, the man who took the now infamous video
of the police placing a chokehold on the victim spoke at memorials, vigils, and other public
events after Garner’s death. Estevan Bassett-Nembhard, Remembering Eric Garner, African
American Father of Six, PEOPLE’S WORLD (July 31, 2014), http://www.peoplesworld.org
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A witness may have legal interests that prompt him to discuss with others what
occurred in the grand jury room (such as where the government is investigating joint
conduct among associates), he may have economic or personal interests that motivate
him to share what transpired (such as with an employer or a loved one), or he may
have a motive to disseminate his story to the media in order to influence debate about
public affairs. Nonetheless, prosecutors often try to curtail these free speech rights.
This Article examines whether such prosecutorial control is a form of overreaching
that impedes the legitimate function of the grand jury, by isolating and insulating the
grand jury from potentially exculpatory information that might be forthcoming if
grand jury witnesses were allowed more freedom to share their stories with others.
The issue of whether a grand jury witness can be “gagged” may arise in a number
of contexts. The prosecutor may issue a letter to the witness accompanying a grand
jury subpoena exhorting the witness not to reveal to anyone else that they have
received the subpoena or not to discuss the subject of the investigation.22 The
prosecutor may orally instruct the witness outside or inside the grand jury room that
they may not discuss their testimony with others.23 The prosecutor may draft a proffer
letter or cooperation agreement that contains obligations of secrecy on the part of the
witness.24 Or, the prosecutor may ask a court to impose such a restriction when the

/remembering-eric-garner-african-american-father-of-six/ [https://perma.cc/BE8Z-VWC9];
Funeral Held for Man Who Died in NY Police Custody, YAHOO NEWS (July 23, 2014),
http://news.yahoo.com/funeral-held-man-died-ny-police-custody-000218940.html [https://perma.cc
/C8YU-J8VR]. After the grand jury returned a no-bill against the officers, Ramsey Orta once
again made a statement to the media, saying that the grand jury proceeding “wasn’t fair from
the start” and the jurors were not “even paying attention.” “It was bullshit,” Mr. Orta claimed.
Erik Badia, Tina Moore & Corky Siemaszko, Man Who Filmed Eric Garner in Chokehold
Says Grand Jury Was Rigged, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 5, 2014, 5:02 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/eric-garner-grand-jury-rigged-man-filmed-chokehold
-article-1.2033257 [https://perma.cc/X764-UBJA].
22. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5 (noting that although it is now widely understood
that it is improper for a federal prosecutor to advise grand jury witnesses that they may not
disclose the substance of their testimony to others, “the practice [still] lingers.”). Compare
United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the prosecutor did
not violate Rule (6)(e) or the Due Process Clause by sending the grand jury a subpoena with a
cover letter requesting the witness not to disclose the existence or the content of the subpoena),
with In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 814 F.2d 61, 68–70 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding that a letter
instructing witnesses not to disclose the existence of a subpoena or the fact that they had
complied with the subpoena for a period of ninety days impermissibly conveyed that witnesses
were obliged to remain silent).
23. SUSAN W. BRENNER & LORI E. SHAW, 2 FEDERAL GRAND JURY: A GUIDE TO LAW AND
PRACTICE § 16.10, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2014). See United States v. Clemones,
577 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1978) (describing an instance where a magistrate issued an order
that the prosecutor must reinstruct grand jury witnesses); In re Proceedings Before the Grand
Jury Summoned October 12, 1970, 321 F. Supp. 238, 240–41 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (granting a
motion restraining the prosecutor from instructing grand jury witnesses that they must report
back to the prosecutor’s office if any party interrogated them about what questions they were
asked in the grand jury).
24. See JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 2.24 (4th ed. 2008)
(lamenting that prosecutors still persist in attempting to seal the lips of witnesses despite the
language in Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). See also United States v.
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prosecutor brings a motion before the court to immunize the witness and/or compel
his testimony.25 The first two situations present examples of soft intimidation that
may be difficult to detect and control.26 The latter two examples—what I shall call
formal but “extrastatutory” secrecy obligations—are the subject of this Article.
As a way to illustrate the complexity of this issue and the situations in which it
may arise, consider the following two hypotheticals.
Hypothetical one. An employee of a major pharmaceutical company is
subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating health care fraud. Represented
by counsel, the employee asserts his Fifth Amendment right before the grand jury
and declines to testify. The prosecutor wishes to entertain a “proffer” from the
witness, under which the witness will give a complete and candid disclosure of all
relevant information known to him in exchange for the government’s promise not to

Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 569–71 (5th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 561 U.S. 358
(2010) (involving Enron defendant alleging that the prosecution impeded access to witnesses
in the manner in which it drafted cooperation agreements; the court of appeals affirmed
judgment of conviction on the grounds that the district court remedied any potential prejudice
by writing all witnesses a letter prior to trial explaining that they were not limited in what
information they shared with defense); United States v. Salcedo-Smith, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1090,
1091–92 (W.D. Mo. 2006) (denying motion to prohibit the government from sending proffer
agreements that required the suspect to keep content of the proffer interview confidential and
not disclose it to any nongovernment representative without approval of an Assistant U.S.
Attorney). It is difficult to ascertain how frequently federal and state prosecutors include
secrecy provisions in their cooperation agreements because such letters are not public
documents unless and until there is a trial on the merits, the witness testifies, and a copy of the
agreement is introduced into evidence. The author is personally aware of instances in the
District of Massachusetts where prosecutors presented defense attorneys with draft
cooperation agreements that contained secrecy obligations. Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys’
Manual encourages prosecutors to be aggressive about protecting the secrecy of grand jury
proceedings. For example, section 9-11.142 provides that every financial institution that is
served with a subpoena for financial records should be advised that civil and criminal penalties
exist in certain circumstances for notifying their account holders of the receipt or content of
that subpoena. OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-11.142 (1997). The relevance of the Financial Privacy Act to grand
jury secrecy will be discussed infra Part III.
25. BRENNER & SHAW, supra note 23, § 16.10. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417
F.3d 18, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (granting the government’s motion to compel grand jury testimony
over a claim of privilege and including order of nondisclosure). It is difficult to determine
exactly how often gag orders are sought in the immunity application context because immunity
applications and judicial immunity orders are typically placed under seal. See, e.g., Lugosch
v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Smith,
985 F. Supp. 2d 506, 517–19 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Antitrust Grand Jury Investigation, 508
F. Supp. 397, 397 (E.D. Va. 1980).
26. I am not conceding that a prosecutor’s instructions to a witness (orally or by letter)
not to talk to others about the content of their testimony is a benign practice. Especially if the
witness is not represented by counsel, he or she may interpret the instruction “please keep the
contents of this subpoena and your testimony thereunder confidential because there are
criminal consequences for obstruction of justice” as an authoritative command rather than a
request.
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use this information against the witness.27 The prosecutor includes language in the
proffer agreement whereby the witness agrees not to tell his employer or anyone else
in the company what questions the government asked or what information the
witness provided during the proffer session. After obtaining such a proffer and
interviewing the witness, the prosecutor determines that the government would like
to secure the witness’s testimony before the grand jury notwithstanding the witness’s
assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The prosecutor then enters into a
nonprosecution agreement with the witness, whereby the witness agrees to cooperate
with the government and testify in the grand jury and at any future proceedings, in
exchange for an agreement by the government not to prosecute him. Again, the
prosecutor includes in this written nonprosecution agreement a promise by the
witness not to talk with others about the content of his testimony during the pendency
of the grand jury proceeding.
Hypothetical two. A United States senator approaches authorities with a claim that
he is being extorted. According to the purported victim, he fathered a child with a
woman with whom he was having an extramarital relationship, and he has been
secretly supporting that child for the past three years. Recently the senator was
contacted by the woman’s current boyfriend, a body builder and personal trainer, and
threatened with public exposure and physical violence unless he pays the boyfriend
$1 million. The senator is represented by counsel. Prosecutors begin a grand jury
investigation into the allegation of extortion and threats on a public official. They
subpoena the alleged mother of the senator’s child to testify before the grand jury.
The woman asserts her Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The
prosecutor petitions a judge to issue an immunity order under 18 U.S.C. § 6003.28
Under pressure from the senator’s lawyer, who wishes to shield his client from
embarrassing publicity for as long as possible, the prosecutor requests that the judge
considering the immunity application also issue a “gag order” on the witness,
preventing her from disclosing to the media or to any third parties information that
is the subject of the grand jury inquiry for the duration of the investigation.
In both of the above scenarios, an agent of the state is imposing an obligation of
secrecy on a witness before the grand jury. In jurisdictions that have a rule of criminal
procedure that defines the parameters of grand jury secrecy and excludes grand jury
witnesses, the question is whether some other source of authority allows the
prosecutor (in hypothetical one) or the court (in hypothetical two) to prevent the
witness from releasing information. Or, stated another way, are prosecutors and
courts simply “going rogue” when they impose secrecy obligations on witnesses
beyond those expressly contemplated by the applicable rules of criminal procedure?
In Part II below I will analyze the professional responsibility of prosecutors, and in
Part III I will address the scope and limits of judicial authority.

27. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and
Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003); Benjamin A. Naftalis, Note, “Queen for a Day”
Agreements and the Proper Scope of Permissible Waiver of the Federal Plea-Statement Rules,
37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1 (2003).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (2012).
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II. MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3.4(f)
ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4(f) prohibits a lawyer from
requesting a person “other than a client” to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant
information “to another party” except in certain limited situations of interest
alignment (such as where the witness is an employee or relative of the lawyer’s
client).29 As will be discussed below, the purpose of the rule is to prevent advocates
from blocking an opponent’s access to information. Whether a prosecutor violates
Rule 3.4(f)30 when she conditions a proffer or nonprosecution agreement on a grand
jury witness’s willingness to refrain from talking to other persons about information
they provided to the government depends upon a proper construction of the term
“another party.” Does the term “party” in Rule 3.4(f) mean a party to ongoing
litigation (the narrower sense of the term) or does it mean a person, group or entity
(the broader sense of the term)? If the former meaning applies, requesting a witness
not to talk to a potential target of a grand jury investigation does not violate the
attorney disciplinary rule because prior to indictment the target is not yet a formal
“party” to litigation. If the latter meaning applies, requesting a grand jury witness not
to talk to other persons or entities about their testimony violates the rule.
Rule 3.4(f) first appeared as part of the Kutak Commission Report in 1981 and
was adopted by the ABA in 1983. It had no direct analogue in the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. DR 7-109(B) in the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility contained a much narrower provision that only prohibited a lawyer
from causing “a person to secrete himself or to leave the jurisdiction of a tribunal for
the purpose of making him unavailable as a witness therein.”31 The 1983 version of
the disciplinary rule is significantly broader because it prevents a lawyer from asking
someone not closely related to a client “to refrain from giving relevant information
to another party.”32 The Kutak Commission Report was imprecise about the new
rule’s intended breadth, although its purpose clearly was to promote the free flow of
information during case preparation.33
Several state ethics boards have ruled that it is improper under Rule 3.4(f) for a
prosecutor to request victims or witnesses not to talk to the defendant, his counsel,
or an investigator working on the defendant’s case after charges have been
commenced.34 Such conduct obviously impedes the defendant’s ability to gather

29. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (1983).
30. Under the McDade Amendment, federal prosecutors are obliged to follow the rules of
professional responsibility in effect in the states where they conduct their activities. 28 U.S.C.
§ 530B (2012).
31. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-109(B) (1980).
32. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(f) (1983).
33. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 1 (1983) (“The procedure of the
adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled competitively
by the contending parties.”).
34. See State Bar of Mich., Informal Ethics Op. RI-302 (1997) (stating that it is improper
for a prosecutor to advise complaining witness not to talk to a defense lawyer, interpreting
Rule 3.4(f)); Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op.
98-134 (1999) (same, interpreting state variation of Rule 3.4(d)); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory
Comm., Ethics Advisory Op. 99-14 (1999) (stating that a city solicitor and part-time
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evidence to mount a defense. “Another party” in Rule 3.4(f) should also be
interpreted to include the putative target or targets of a grand jury investigation, who
the prosecutor has reason to know may be indicted in the future. This interpretation
is consistent with the construction of the rule, its purpose, and its history.
The starting point for an analysis of Rule 3.4(f) must be ABA Ethics Opinion 131
(1935), cited as a leading authority for the prohibition against asking a witness to
secrete himself or herself in the 1969 Model Code.35 In Opinion 131, the Committee
on Professional Ethics took the view that it is improper for an attorney to influence
persons other than clients or employees to refuse to give information to opposing
counsel.36 In a widely quoted and influential section of this opinion, the committee
stated: “All persons who know anything about the facts in controversy are, in simple
truth, the law’s witnesses. They are the human instrumentalities through which the
law, and its ministers, the judges and the lawyers, endeavor to ascertain truth, and to
award justice to the contending parties.”37
The committee grounded its analysis in part on the obligation for a lawyer’s
conduct “before the [c]ourt and with other lawyers [to] be characterized by candor
and fairness.”38 There is language in the opinion that suggests its proscription applies
to both pending and contemplated litigation: “No lawyer should endeavor in any
way, directly or indirectly, to prevent the truth from being presented to the court in
the event litigation arises.”39
This interpretation of Rule 3.4(f) is also consistent with the Rule’s structure. The
title of the Rule is “Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel.” In the section of the
rule dealing with pretrial discovery, drafters prohibited “mak[ing] a frivolous
discovery request or fail[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort[s] to comply with a
legally proper discovery request by an opposing party.”40 The drafters clearly knew
how to use the term “opposing party” when they meant to limit the prohibition to
ongoing litigation, yet they chose to use the term “another party” in section (a) of the
rule (pertaining to access to evidence) and section (f) (pertaining to access to
witnesses). It is reasonable to conclude from this construction that the “parties”
contemplated by the latter two sections include both current litigants and future
persons or entities whose legal positions are likely to become adverse. Indeed,

prosecutor could not advise a municipal public safety officer not to speak to defense attorneys
in criminal cases, interpreting Rule 3.4(f)); see also Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185,
188–89 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (reversing murder and robbery conviction for prosecutorial
misconduct; among other grounds, prosecutor deprived defendant of due process by advising
witnesses not to speak to defense counsel unless prosecutor was present); David S. Caudill,
Professional Deregulation of Prosecutors: Defense Contact with Victims, Survivors, and
Witnesses in the Era of Victim’s Rights, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 105 (2003).
35. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-27 & n.45 (1980).
36. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935) (stating that
where an attorney influences persons other than his clients and their employees to refuse to
give information which may be useful to opposing counsel he violates the principles in Canons
15, 22, 32, 39).
37. Id.
38. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 22 (1908) (emphasis added).
39. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 131 (1935) (emphasis added).
40. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d) (1983).
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comment 2 to Rule 3.4 implicitly supports this construction. In support of the
adoption of the new rule, comment 2 acknowledges that “[a]pplicable law in many
jurisdictions makes it an offense to destroy material for purpose of impairing its
availability in a pending proceeding or one whose commencement can be foreseen.”41
Rule 3.4(f) reflects the principle that attorneys for both current and prospective
litigants should be able to conduct interviews with witnesses free of adversarial
interference.42 The purpose of the rule is to allow both sides of a potential dispute to
gather evidence that may be useful in asserting or defending a cause. “Witnesses are
free agents and may decline to be interviewed, but adversary interference with a
witness’s decision whether or not to cooperate undermines the principles of fair
competition on which the system depends.”43 When a prosecutor tells a cooperating
witness not to talk to potential targets of the investigation about their grand jury
testimony (for example, in the corporate context, the witness’s employer or fellow
employees—as in hypothetical one above), she is impeding the ability of that target
to gather evidence. Information about what line of inquiry the prosecutor is pursuing
and what facts may be relevant to that inquiry could help the target find and preserve
documentary evidence and locate other witnesses who may have knowledge of
pertinent facts.
Advising witnesses not to talk to the “other side” impedes fact collection in the
preliminary hearing context as much as it does in the trial context. In this regard,
grand jury proceedings should be treated no differently than probable cause hearings,
which occur after the initiation of formal charges but perform much the same
function. What a prosecutor could not do in the latter instance, she should not be
allowed to do in the former instance. Grand jury investigations already give
prosecutors a huge head start in collecting evidence, locking in witnesses under oath,
and preparing for trial. Including a “gag” provision in a cooperation agreement

41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (1983) (emphasis added).
42. Jon Bauer, Buying Witness Silence: Evidence-Suppressing Settlements and Lawyers’
Ethics, 87 OR. L. REV. 481, 532–33 (2008). Professor Bauer argues that a lawyer’s drafting
of— or recommendation to his client that the client execute—a civil settlement agreement that
prohibits the plaintiff from sharing information with future litigants violates Rule 3.4(f).
Analyzing the history and purpose of the rule, Bauer concludes that at least in the civil context,
the term “another party” in 3.4(f) should mean a person who has an interest in the dispute or
transaction or a potential future claim, regardless of whether the lawsuit has yet been filed. Id.
at 551.
43. Id. at 532. Interestingly, the aspirational and nonbinding Prosecution Standards issued
by the American Bar Association phrase this principle in slightly different terms, albeit ones
that support my argument that the prohibition on obstructing access to witnesses should apply
prior to indictment. Standard 3-3.4(h) now states that “[t]he prosecutor should not advise any
person, or cause any person to be advised, to decline to provide defense counsel with
information which such person has a right to give.” STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 3-3.4(h) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1992) (emphasis
added). Because this standard uses the term “defense counsel” rather than “another party,” the
possible ambiguity of whether it applies prior to the initiation of formal litigation is avoided.
Where a defense attorney has notified the prosecutor that he represents a target or subject of
the grand jury investigation, and the prosecutor is aware that there is a lawyer involved in the
case who may seek to interview witnesses, drafting a cooperation agreement that contains
broad secrecy provisions clearly violates this standard.
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further exacerbates this advantage because it handcuffs the target of the investigation
from talking to witnesses who may help the target understand the nature of the
allegations and begin to shape a defense.
In an analogous context, the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that it is
unethical conduct for a defense attorney representing the subject of a grand jury
investigation to recommend that a nonclient witness decline to cooperate with
investigating authorities.44 Even though this conduct occurred prior to charging, the
court ruled that an attempt by the defense counsel to block the government’s access
to witnesses violated a state disciplinary rule.45 Fair play and adversarial balance
certainly suggest that if a defense attorney may not obstruct the government’s access
to witnesses during a grand jury investigation, the prosecutor may not engage in
similar behavior.
Perhaps the most compelling argument that might be advanced for allowing a
prosecutor to condition a proffer or nonprosecution agreement on the grand jury
witness’s promise not to discuss his testimony with others is that such a provision
might help prevent targets from fleeing, destroying physical evidence, and
intimidating other witnesses. One response to this argument is that in those majority
jurisdictions that exempt witnesses from the obligation of grand jury secrecy in their
rules of criminal procedure,46 the legislature has already balanced the competing
interests of public safety and freedom of expression, and has come down on the side
of the latter.47 Moreover, criminal penalties exist in most jurisdictions for perjury,
intimidation of witnesses, and obstruction of justice.48 A witness who is not

44. In re Blatt, 324 A.2d 15, 18 (N.J. 1974) (suspending a defense attorney for two years,
and resting the decision on “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” provisions of
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(5) (1971)).
45. Id.
46. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
47. See King v. Jones, 319 F. Supp. 653, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (involving Kent State
grand jury witnesses who sought a federal injunction vacating a state common pleas court
order that prohibited them from talking to the media; the federal court entered an injunction
restraining the state defendants from enforcing that order because the Ohio legislature had
already made a determination that no such restraint was required of witnesses before grand
jury), rev’d and vacated on other grounds, 450 F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1971).
48. See John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American
Criminal Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49, 77–90 (2004) (reviewing federal and state legislation); see
also Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 633–36 (1990) (striking down a Florida statute that
made it a crime for a grand jury witness to ever divulge his testimony; the Court noted that the
state had enacted substantial criminal penalties for both perjury and tampering with witnesses,
and therefore “the additional effect of the ban here in question is marginal at best and
insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in speech involved”). A recent
high-profile example of an effective obstruction prosecution is the government’s decision to
charge three college classmates of Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev with the
crime of obstruction of justice for, among other conduct, removing their friend’s backpack
from his dorm room and throwing it in a landfill. Two of the three classmates pleaded guilty
and one was convicted after trial. See Denise Lavoie, Boston Marathon Bomber’s College
Friends Face Sentencing, CBS BOS. (June 1, 2015, 7:20 PM), http://boston.cbslocal.com/2015
/06/01/boston-marathon-bombers-college-friends-face-sentencing/ [https://perma.cc/QU5G
-HC3U]; Patricia Wen, Jurors Convict Friend of Tsarnaev, BOS. GLOBE (July 21, 2014),
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dissuaded by criminal penalties from assisting a target to obstruct a grand jury
investigation will not be dissuaded by the terms of a contractual agreement. And
since the target is not bound by the cooperation agreement in any event, contractual
secrecy provisions add little to the government’s ability to detect and prosecute a
target’s corruption of the grand jury’s truth-finding function. 49
Another reason prosecutors may sometimes overreach and attempt to “gag” grand
jury witnesses is that they are attempting to protect their own work product.50 A
witness can often piece together the government’s theory of its case from the
questions asked and the documents referenced in the grand jury room. If witnesses
are allowed to reveal to targets what occurred before the grand jury, the target will
get an advance preview of the government’s case. However, the attorney
work-product doctrine cannot justify prosecutors seeking to silence grand jury
witnesses. The Supreme Court has recognized that the work-product doctrine applies
to criminal as well as civil cases.51 This qualified privilege is now reflected in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.52 Yet both the common law and statutory
privileges protect against disclosure of documents and tangible things prepared by a
lawyer or her agent in anticipation of litigation.53 A witness’s independent
recollection of what questions the prosecutor orally asked him in front of the grand
jury simply are not protected by the work-product rule.54

https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/21/jury-resumes-deliberations-trial-azamat
-tazhayakov-friend-boston-marathon-bombing-suspect-dzhokhar-tsarnaev/6H1OxaskP38B3v15ryzvPJ
/story.html [https://perma.cc/97NG-6W6N]; Patricia Wen, Tsarnaev Friend to Plead Guilty
in Obstruction Case, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro
/2014/08/20/tsarnaev-friend-dias-kadyrbayev-expected-plead-guilty-obstruction-charges
/YgZBn7NGFRX8iigKKBQO1L/story.html [https://perma.cc/AE9D-JYN3].
49. Prosecutors would likely argue that without contractual secrecy obligations in
cooperation agreements, a witness may inform a target of the fact and content of their
testimony without an intent to obstruct justice (such as out of familial loyalty or business
relationship), and then the target may thereafter flee or destroy evidence. That is perhaps the
most compelling argument that can be advanced in favor of imposing a secrecy obligation on
witnesses. But, as the majority of jurisdictions have recognized in their decision to exclude
witnesses from any oath of secrecy, this risk is outweighed by the free speech rights of the
witness and by the target’s right to honestly gather evidence in his defense.
50. United States v. Salcedo-Smith, 461 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1091–93 (W.D. Mo. 2006)
(discussing the government’s argument that the standard proffer agreement was justified to
protect attorney work product; the court found no due process violation without addressing
this work product argument).
51. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238–40 (1975) (holding that while the
work-product doctrine applies in criminal cases, respondent waived that privilege when he
elected to present his investigator as a witness).
52. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2), (b)(2).
53. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (protecting documents, objects, recordings, and reports);
Nobles, 422 U.S. at 237–38 (describing the contours of work-product); Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495, 509–12 (1947) (same); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
54. The Supreme Court ruled in Goldberg v. United States that a prosecutor’s notes of a
witness interview otherwise producible as a witness statement under the Jencks Act were not
protected by the work-product doctrine. 425 U.S. 94, 108 (1976). See also FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(2). If a prosecutor’s notes of a witness interview are sometimes discoverable
notwithstanding the work-product rule, the witness’s independent recollection of their own
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Fears of obstruction of justice and work-product revelation are spurious
justifications for the practice of including secrecy provisions in proffer and
cooperation agreements. Returning to hypothetical one above, in most jurisdictions
the pharmaceutical employee has every right to talk to his employer about what
questions were asked of him by the government and what information he provided
in the grand jury room. Indeed, such discussions could enable the company to
marshal evidence that will be useful to the grand jury’s investigation by interviewing
other employees with knowledge of the situation, locating and scrutinizing pertinent
documents, and providing such information and analysis to the government.55 The
employee/witness may choose for tactical, economic, or personal reasons not to
discuss his testimony with company management, but the government should not be
allowed to put its thumb on the scale of this decision in the way that it drafts
cooperation agreements.56
Prosecutors undoubtedly will argue that “gag provisions” are part of the legitimate
give and take of plea bargaining; if cooperating witnesses are willing to agree to
them, the law should not stand in the way of obligations freely undertaken in
exchange for charging or sentencing considerations. But such a contract analysis
misconstrues the purposes and reach of Rule 3.4(f), which is an ethical obligation of
attorneys. State prosecutors and the Department of Justice lost a similar argument in
the 1990s, when they tried to argue that the “no-contact” provisions of Model Rule

interview with the prosecutor certainly cannot be protected.
55. Jeffery B. Coopersmith & Rachel Herd, If I Can’t Be in the Grand Jury Room, Maybe
My PowerPoint Can: Revisiting the Government’s Duty To Present Exculpatory Evidence to
the Grand Jury, THE CHAMPION, Sept. 2014, at 36, 37–38 (encouraging defense attorneys to
prepare and bring exculpatory information to the attention of federal prosecutors and demand
that they fulfill their duty under the U.S. Attorney’s Manual to alert the grand jury).
56. In my hypothetical, the lawyer for the employee and the lawyer(s) for the company
may have entered into a “joint defense agreement.” The subject of joint defense agreements is
beyond the scope of this Article. Typically, a joint defense agreement allows the parties thereto
to share information with each other in confidence while retaining the right to argue that the
attorney-client privilege protects intragroup communications in furtherance of a joint legal
strategy. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243–44 (2d Cir. 1989); United States
v. Bay State Ambulance & Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1989). See
generally Deborah Stavile Bartel, Reconceptualizing the Joint Defense Doctrine, 65 FORDHAM
L. REV. 871 (1996) (discussing joint defense agreements and arguing they should be
recognized independent of work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege). In the
criminal context, a typical joint defense agreement contains a clause obligating a party to
withdraw from that agreement and notify the other parties thereto if and when they begin to
cooperate with the government. Patrick J. Sharkey, Unwrapping the Mystery of Joint Defense
Agreements, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND
STRATEGIES 181 (2008), Westlaw SN084. Prosecutors justifiably are concerned in the proffer
context that, notwithstanding such mandatory withdrawal, a lawyer for a cooperating witness
may share information about the questions asked during the proffer interview with lawyers
representing other employees of the company or company management. I would argue that
the protections against sharing client confidences under ABA Model Rule 1.6(a) and state
variations thereto already safeguard against such behavior by criminal defense attorneys once
they have withdrawn from a joint defense agreement. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R.
1.6(a) (2003).
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4.257 should not impede a prosecutor’s investigative ability to debrief a represented
defendant who wished to speak to the government without his counsel present.58 The
argument that suspects could “waive” Rule 4.2 misconstrued the purpose of the
no-contact rule, which was to impose an obligation on counsel not to undertake
action that could drive a wedge between a client and his attorney. “The rule against
communicating with represented parties is fundamentally concerned with the duties
of an attorney, not with the rights of the parties.”59 Similarly, the argument that a
criminal suspect or witness may lawfully agree to a gag provision in a cooperation
agreement misconstrues the purpose of Rule 3.4(f), which is to prevent lawyers from
intentionally creating barriers to an opposing counsel’s access to evidence.
III. FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 6(e) AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, the practice in
most federal courts was to require grand jury witnesses to take an oath of secrecy.60
But Rule 6 expressly altered this common law practice when it was first enacted in
1946. Rule 6(e)(2)(B) prohibits persons performing an “official function” before the
grand jury (namely, the government lawyer, stenographer, recorder, interpreter, and
jurors themselves) from disclosing what occurred before the grand jury, except as
may be authorized by the court or other rules.61 But Rule 6(e)(2)(A) provides that
“[n]o obligation of secrecy may be imposed on any person except in accordance with
Rule 6(e)(2)(B).”62 The Advisory Committee Note states that the express purpose of
section (A) was to eliminate the common law practice of ordering secrecy on the part
of grand jury witnesses. “The seal of secrecy on witnesses seems an unnecessary
hardship and may lead to injustice if a witness is not permitted to make a disclosure
to counsel or to an associate.”63 Like the federal courts, a majority of states now
similarly exclude grand jury witnesses from any obligation of secrecy.64

57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (1983).
58. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1461–64 (9th Cir. 1993); State v.
Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 462–64 (Minn. 1999).
59. Lopez, 4 F.3d at 1462 (emphasis in original).
60. See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516, 520 (9th Cir. 1939) (discussing practices
among the states and federal districts, and concluding that “[i]t would seem to be well within
the discretionary power of the court to impose an oath of secrecy not alone upon grand jurors,
but upon the witnesses, if the court believes the precaution necessary in the investigation of
crime”).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B).
62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(A).
63. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), advisory committee’s note 2 (1944).
64. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.5. Nine states impose an obligation of secrecy
on witnesses, but exempt communication between the witness and his attorney, and three
impose an obligation of secrecy on witnesses without such an exemption. Compare ALA. CODE
§§ 12-16-215, -216, -222 (LexisNexis 2012), and COLO. R. CRIM. P. 6.3, and FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.27(1), (3) (West 2014), and IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-34-2-5.5, -34-2-10(a) (2014), and
KY. R. CRIM. P. 5.24(1), and LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 434(A), and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 767.19f (West 2000 & Supp. 2015), and N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-623(e), (g) (West
2009), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-10.1-30(4) (2006), with MISS. UNIF. R. CIR. AND CTY. CT.
7.04, and MO. ANN. STAT. § 540.110 (West 2002), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.090(3)
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An early commentator on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Professor
George Dession, wrote that under the new rules, “requiring witnesses before the
grand jury to take an oath of secrecy is therefore no longer authorized, such
restriction being considered impractical and unfair.”65 He quoted with approval
Judge George Zerdin Medalie, also a member of the Advisory Committee:
I know that some of the judges in some of the district courts have refused
to administer such an oath, and have set themselves against punishment
for contempt for breach of that oath, if taken. Others, however, have
believed in that oath, and have enforced it by contempt orders. . . . It was
impractical and unreal—a partner, an employee, a relative, a friend called
on to testify will come back and tell the person concerning whom he
testified, and it should be so.66
A more direct statement of the intent behind the language of Rule 6(e)(2)(A) would
be very difficult to imagine.
The issue that has bedeviled the federal appeals courts is whether Rule 6(e) simply
states a default position that certain persons appearing before the grand jury are
automatically subject to a secrecy obligation and certain persons are not, or whether
the rule further curtails the power of a court—even when presented with compelling
circumstances—to issue an order of secrecy to a grand jury witness in the context of
a particular case. Some courts have taken the former position, maintaining that courts
have inherent authority to protect the integrity of the grand jury proceedings
notwithstanding the express exemption in Rule 6(e) where disclosure of information
would jeopardize the grand jury’s investigation.67 Other courts have ruled that the
language “no obligation of secrecy may be imposed” is clear, and when coupled with

(West 2002 & Supp. 2015).
65. George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L.J.
197, 204 (1947) (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 204 n.100 (citing Address by Medalie, FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: WITH NOTES PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
APPOINTED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE 155
(Alexander Holtzoff ed., 1946)).
67. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts
have inherent power, subject to the Constitution and federal statutes, to impose secrecy orders
incident to matters occurring before them.”); In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand Jury,
864 F.2d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989) (upholding the district court’s discretion to enter order
prohibiting the university from discussing subject matter of testimony before the grand jury or
disclosing materials prepared in response to a grand jury subpoena); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 797 F.2d 676, 680 (8th Cir. 1986) (“We therefore conclude that,
upon a proper showing in an appropriate case, the district court may direct a grand jury witness
to keep secret from targets of the investigation the existence of a subpoena, the nature of the
documents subpoenaed, or testimony before the grand jury, for an appropriate period of
time.”); In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 486 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D. Md. 1979) (“In light of the
court’s conclusions that it has supervisory powers over the grand jury and that Rule 6(e) is not
an impediment to the issuance of the orders under the circumstances of this case, the court has
the power under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to issue the orders involved.”).
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the Advisory Committee note referenced above expressly limits the court’s authority
to gag grand jury witnesses.68
The latter position in this circuit split is the better interpretation of the two. The
lower federal courts derive their powers from Congress.69 Although the Supreme
Court has recognized that there are certain fundamental powers that are “inherent”
to functioning as a court under Article III,70 the doctrine of inherent powers itself is
a “shadowy” and “nebulous” concept.71 The Court has upheld a district court’s
supervisory power over the administration of criminal justice,72 but “it has rejected
attempts to invoke such power in defiance of positive federal law, either
constitutional or statutory.”73 Where Congress has spoken directly on a particular

68. See, e.g., United States v. Radetsky, 535 F.2d 556, 569 (10th Cir. 1976) (refusing to
compel witness to testify before grand jury when foreman of grand jury had included in
witness’s oath an obligation not to discuss the subject of his testimony: “We must agree the
admonition to the witness is contrary to the provisions of Rule 6(e)”); In re Vescovo Special
Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1336 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (“Under Rule 6(e) no obligation of
secrecy may be imposed upon grand jury witnesses. Witnesses may be interviewed after their
appearance and repeat what they said before the grand jury or relate any knowledge they have
on the subject of the inquiry.” (citations omitted)).
69. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943) (“All federal courts, other than the
Supreme Court, derive their jurisdiction wholly from the exercise of the authority to ‘ordain
and establish’ inferior courts, conferred on Congress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution.”).
70. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42–58 (1991) (upholding a court’s use of its
inherent power to impose payment of attorney’s fees to sanction misconduct before it).
71. Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
72. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1433, 1433–34 (1984).
73. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 781 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Professor Pushaw argues
that our constitutional structure and the fact that Article I contains a Necessary and Proper
Clause while Article III does not suggests that the inherent powers doctrine should best be
understood by recognizing two distinct categories of inherent judicial authority: (1) implied
indispensable powers are those ancillary to actions that are absolutely essential to fulfill the
Article III mandate to exercise “judicial power,” and (2) “beneficial” inherent powers are those
that are merely helpful, useful, or convenient for federal judges. Id. at 741–43. Pushaw argues
that Congress can restrict or even eliminate powers merely asserted for the sake of convenience
or utility, for doing so does not seriously impair or destroy the Article III role. Id. at 834.
“[F]ederal courts should defer to procedural and evidentiary statutes (or derivative rules), even
if they would prefer a different legal standard, except in the rare instance where Congress has
attempted to eliminate or impair an implied indispensable power.” Id. at 851. In Carlisle v.
United States, the Supreme Court concluded that federal district courts lack “inherent
supervisory power” to establish rules that regulate their own proceedings if that action
circumvents or conflicts with express Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 517 U.S. 416,
425–28 (1996) (finding that a court is without the power to entertain a motion for judgment of
acquittal filed by the defendant one day late under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c)).
“Whatever the scope of this ‘inherent power,’ however, it does not include the power to
develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id.
at 426.
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subject, a court’s inherent power is at its weakest.74 Powers that are “inherent” only
in the sense that they are useful in the pursuit of a just result (such as gagging
witnesses) may only be exercised in the absence of a contrary legislative directive.75
Rule 6(e), approved by Congress pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, is just such a
contrary legislative directive—the clear language of the rule (“no obligation may be
imposed”) speaks to the power of the government, not the power of the witness.
Several of the decisions that recognized the inherent authority of federal courts to
gag grand jury witnesses were decided before the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in
United States v. Williams.76 In Williams, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the issue of “[w]hether an indictment may be dismissed because the
government failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.”77 The
respondent argued that imposing such an obligation on prosecutors was mandated by
the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of indictment by a grand jury for serious crimes,
or in the alternative was authorized by the Tenth Circuit’s general supervisory power
over the grand jury.78 The Court rejected both arguments, ruling that dismissal of a
federal indictment due to the prosecutor’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury was improper.79 The majority concluded that a court’s power to
regulate grand jury proceedings is not as broad as its supervisory power over its own
proceedings.80 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reasoned that federal courts
lack general supervisory power over the grand jury because grand juries are not
“judicial” proceedings under Article III of the Constitution.81 Therefore, the Court
proclaimed that the judiciary’s supervisory power over the grand jury should be
limited to situations where the Constitution, a statute, or an express rule has been
violated in the way the grand jury proceeding was conducted.82 Since the grand jury
is not an Article III tribunal, after Williams a lower court has no inherent power to
act to protect those proceedings.
Moreover, some of the early federal court decisions that recognized the inherent
authority of a district court to gag grand jury witnesses—notwithstanding a rule of
criminal procedure that points precisely in the opposite direction—involved grand
jury subpoenas for bank records.83 These decisions predated a crucial 1986

74. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988) (rejecting court’s
reliance on inherent authority to dismiss an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct in
contravention of procedure set out in FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)); Palermo v. United States, 360
U.S. 343, 355–56 (1959) (upholding Jencks Act and Congress’s ability to limit the Court’s
supervisory authority over prosecution’s disclosure of witness statements).
75. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.
76. 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
77. Id. at 40.
78. Id. at 45.
79. Id. at 51.
80. Id. at 50.
81. Id. at 47. Justice Scalia relied on the fact that the grand jury is not mentioned in the
body of the Constitution, but only in the Bill of Rights, to support his conclusion that it belongs
to none of the three branches of government. Id. He also pointed both to the scope of the grand
jury’s power, and to the manner in which it was exercised, to distinguish it from Article III
courts. Id. at 48.
82. Id. at 46.
83. See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.17. See also, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena
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amendment to the Right to Financial Privacy Act.84 That Act provides for
confidentiality of customer financial records and limits when and how they may be
disseminated. When the statute was first enacted in 1978, it required financial
institutions to notify customers if they turned over customer records in response to a
subpoena.85 But grand jury subpoenas were expressly exempted from that provision
of the Act.86 They were also exempted from a section of the Act that allowed
prosecutors to request a court to order delay of notification for ninety days if there
was reason to believe that such notice could result in flight, destruction of evidence,
intimidation of a witness, and so forth.87 So banks were not required to notify their
customers about grand jury subpoenas, but there was also no judicial mechanism for
preventing them from doing so.88 In 1986, Congress resolved this ambiguity by
passing an amendment that included grand jury subpoenas in the section of the Act
authorizing the government to petition a court for delayed disclosure.89 This
amendment makes clear that where Congress believes that grand jury investigations
might be jeopardized by loose lips on the part of those who receive a subpoena, they
know how to intervene.90 And such action would not have been needed with regard

Duces Tecum, 797 F.2d 676, 678–80 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Swearingen Aviation Corp., 486
F. Supp. 9, 10–12 (D. Md. 1979).
84. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012). See BEALE ET AL., supra note 5, § 5.17.
85. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3403–3407 (1982), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-570, § 1353(a), 100 Stat. 3207.
86. 12 U.S.C. § 3413(i) (1982), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-570, § 1353(b), 100 Stat. 3207.
87. 12 U.S.C. § 3409(a) (2012).
88. Because the old statute did not expressly prevent banks from notifying their clients
that their accounts were subject to a subpoena, many federal prosecutors sought a court order
at the time of issuance of the subpoena forbidding such notice. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 575 F. Supp. 1219, 1220–21 (E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Vescovo Special
Grand Jury, 473 F. Supp. 1335, 1335–36 (C.D. Cal. 1979). That led to the rise of litigation and
resulting circuit court split about whether federal courts had independent authority under Rule
6(e) or the All Writs Act to order the delay of disclosure. See generally Norman A. Bloch,
Gagging Bankers: Grand Jury Nondisclosure Statutes and the First Amendment, 107
BANKING L.J. 441, 445–52 (1990) (discussing laws in effect at the time related to grand jury
nondisclosure).
89. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1353(b), 100 Stat. 3207. In 1989,
the statute was further amended to mandate secrecy (with no need to petition court for order)
for grand jury subpoenas seeking financial records pertaining to certain crimes, including
crimes against financial institutions, crimes under the Controlled Substance Act, money
laundering, and IRS currency violations. See 12 U.S.C. § 3420(b) (2012).
90. Congress has also allowed the government to move for delayed disclosure of
subpoenas for third-party records of electronic and wire communications. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2705(b) (2012). Delayed disclosure orders for document subpoenas do not implicate First
Amendment concerns to the same extent as gag orders for fact witnesses. First and foremost,
the limitation is temporary. Second, the limitation is on disclosing the fact that the record
holder has been subpoenaed and the contents of the subpoena, rather than on disclosing
underlying facts. Finally, where the target of the grand jury investigation is the account holder,
he or she has access to the underlying information that is the subject of the subpoena. Delayed
disclosure to the target that their records have been subpoenaed will not shield them from any
information helpful in preparing their defense. Where the target of the potential investigation
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to bank records under the Financial Privacy Act if federal courts retained independent
authority to gag witnesses whenever they felt it necessary.
Even if I am wrong and courts do retain some inherent authority to silence grand
jury witnesses, they certainly cannot do so where such an order would violate the
First Amendment.91 “[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content.”92 Prior restraints on speech are presumptively
unconstitutional, 93 and the party moving for such a restriction bears a heavy burden
of establishing that it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.94 While
the Supreme Court has recognized in dicta the authority of courts to gag trial
witnesses in order to shield the petite jury from improper influence and protect the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial,95 even those orders may be entered
only in extraordinary circumstances, and only after a detailed and compelling
showing of potential prejudice.96 The state’s interests in protecting grand jury secrecy

is someone other than the account holder, the target would have no right to access that client’s
account information even absent a court order.
91. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST.
amend. I. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964) (“There is no force in
respondent’s argument that the constitutional limitation[] . . . appl[ies] only to Congress . . . .”).
92. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted))
(remanding to the Third Circuit for determination whether the Child Online Protection Act
survives strict scrutiny).
93. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (ruling that it is
unconstitutional to prohibit a newspaper from publishing an article that accurately reported on
an inquiry into judicial misconduct); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 558–59, 570
(1976) (striking down a gag order preventing the media from publishing any inculpatory
details of an alleged murder or admissions made by the defendant pending the outcome of
trial).
94. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2549–51 (2012) (invalidating Stolen
Valor Act); see also Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, No. 13–1499, slip op. at 6–7 (U.S. Apr.
29, 2015) (resulting in five justices agreeing that strict scrutiny should be applied to judicial
campaign speech).
95. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966) (“The courts must take such steps by
rule and regulation that will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences.
Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement
officers coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function.” (emphasis added)).
96. Numerous appellate courts have reversed gag orders on trial witnesses on the grounds
that those orders were entered prematurely and/or upon an inadequate showing of potential
prejudice. See, e.g., Atlanta Journal-Constitution v. State, 596 S.E.2d 694, 696–97 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2004) (holding that the trial court failed to apply the requisite legal standard before
imposing a gag order directed at witnesses and others); State ex rel. Missoulian v. Mont.
Twenty-First Judicial Dist. Court, Ravalli Cnty., 933 P.2d 829, 841 (Mont. 1997) (reversing
order and remanding for further proceedings because the court below did not make “specific
findings that there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be
prejudiced by publicity that the gag order would otherwise prevent” (emphasis in original));
State ex. rel. NBC v. Court of Common Pleas, 556 N.E.2d 1120, 1124 (Ohio 1990) (per
curiam) (prohibiting the enforcement of a gag order due to lack of specific, on the record
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is both different from, and less compelling than, its interest in promoting fairness in
the ultimate criminal trial.
In Butterworth v. Smith,97 the Supreme Court struck down a Florida statute that
prohibited a grand jury witness from ever disclosing his testimony before that body.98
A reporter who testified before the grand jury about alleged improprieties at the
county sheriff’s and state attorney’s offices later sought to write a book about the
subject of his grand jury testimony after the panel had terminated its investigation
into public corruption without indictment.99 The reporter unsuccessfully sought a
declaration before the district court that the Florida grand jury statute was an
unconstitutional abridgement of speech, as well as an injunction preventing the State
from prosecuting him under it.100 The Supreme Court agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit that such a blanket and indefinite prohibition on a grand jury witness from
ever disclosing the contents of his testimony to the grand jury violated the First
Amendment.101 Without expressly deciding what level of compelling interest was
necessary to justify a prior restraint on a person not a party to a judicial proceeding,102
the Court ruled that none of the state’s purported interests in grand jury secrecy, taken
individually or collectively, were compelling enough to save Florida’s statute from
constitutional infirmity.103 “[T]he invocation of grand jury interests is not ‘some

findings demonstrating that order is “essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest” (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
510 (1984))). Courts disagree whether the appropriate constitutional standard that must be met
before imposing gag orders on trial witnesses is “clear and present danger” or the less stringent
“substantial likelihood of prejudice.” David D. Smyth III, A New Framework for Analyzing
Gag Orders Against Trial Witnesses, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 89, 93, 102 (2004) (arguing for “clear
and present danger” standard). Compare United States v. Ford, 830 F.2d 596, 598–99 (6th Cir.
1987), with United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 428 (5th Cir. 2000). There is some
suggestion in Supreme Court precedent that courts may impose gag orders on parties to the
proceeding and their lawyers, upon a lesser showing of substantial likelihood of material
prejudice, because they have obligations towards the tribunal that the court may properly
regulate. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1057 (1991) (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
97. 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
98. FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (1989).
99. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 628.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 636.
102. The parties in Butterworth urged the Court to apply differing First Amendment
standards for prior restraints on speech. The respondent urged the Court to adopt a “clear and
present danger” standard, as applied in Landmark Communications. 435 U.S. at 845 (holding
unconstitutional a state statue making it a crime to divulge information from proceedings
before a state judicial review commission). The petitioner urged the Court to uphold the
restriction on speech of participants in a pending judicial proceeding so long as those
restrictions advanced a substantial governmental interest and were no broader than necessary
to advance those interests. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33–34 (1984) (holding
that a protective order prohibiting a newspaper from publishing information which it had
obtained through discovery procedures as the defendant in a defamation suit did not offend
the First Amendment). In striking down the Florida grand jury statute as applied to respondent,
the Court in Butterworth did not choose between those two standards, or adopt an alternative.
103. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 633–35.
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talisman that dissolves all constitutional protections.’”104 The Court examined the
five interests purportedly served by grand jury secrecy that it had previously
acknowledged in Douglas Oil Co. of California v. Petrol Stops Northwest.105 The
Court reasoned that three of these interests—namely, preventing target flight,
preventing the importuning of grand jurors, and protecting prospective witnesses
from being pressured in their testimony—were irrelevant once the grand jury had
terminated its inquiry and been discharged.106 Two interests were relevant, but were
deemed by the Court “insufficient to outweigh the First Amendment interest in
speech involved.”107 While Florida’s interest in preventing the subornation of perjury
at trial continues beyond indictment, the Court noted that most modern criminal
discovery rules provide the accused with notice of the government’s witnesses
against him prior to trial, and therefore grand jury secrecy provisions do little to
shelter trial witnesses from pressure or intimidation.108 The Court acknowledged that
the Florida statute protected exonerated individuals from having unproven
allegations exposed to the public, but “absent exceptional circumstances,
reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech.”109 The
Court also noted approvingly that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) and its
analogues in many states do not impose any obligation of secrecy on grand jury
witnesses: “While these practices are not conclusive as to the constitutionality of
Florida’s rule, they are probative of the weight to be assigned Florida’s asserted
interests and the extent to which the prohibition in question is necessary to further
them.”110 The reporter-witness in Butterworth was thus free to publish information
in his possession about alleged improprieties by county officials, insofar as they were
facts “he was in possession [of] before” the grand jury investigation111 and/or
involved “his own testimony”112 before the grand jury. The Court held that “insofar
as the Florida law prohibits a grand jury witness from disclosing his own testimony
after the term of the grand jury has ended, it violates the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution.” 113
There are at least three possible ways to read the Butterworth decision. One
reading suggests that the Florida statute was overbroad because it barred grand jury
witnesses indefinitely from revealing or discussing the contents of their testimony.

104. Id. at 630 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973)).
105. Id. at 632–35 (discussing Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211
(1979)). See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
106. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 632–33. The concern that some witnesses will be deterred
from testifying if they know that their testimony may later be revealed is inapplicable, since
grand jury witnesses remain free to choose not to disclose their own testimony, and the
respondent did not challenge the statute’s prohibition insofar as it prevented the somewhat
unusual circumstance of one grand jury witness from being able to reveal the identity or
testimony of another. Id. at 633.
107. Id. at 634.
108. Id. at 633.
109. Id. at 634.
110. Id. at 635.
111. Id. at 632.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 626.
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This suggests that a narrower prohibition, limited temporally to the length of the
grand jury’s inquiry, might survive constitutional scrutiny. This reading has been
adopted by the Tenth Circuit.114 Another reading of Butterworth, espoused by Justice
Scalia in his concurring opinion, is that witnesses can never be prohibited from
discussing facts to which they were called upon to testify before the grand jury,
provided that the witness has an independent source for those facts, but that the
witness may be barred, even permanently, from discussing what actually occurred
during the grand jury proceeding.115 This reading is supported by the language in
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion distinguishing Rhinehart, where the
Court stated, “[h]ere, by contrast, we deal only with respondent’s right to divulge
information of which he was in possession before he testified before the grand jury,
and not information which he may have obtained as a result of his participation in
the proceedings of the grand jury.”116 This construction of Butterworth has been
adopted by the First Circuit and several other courts.117 The narrowest possible
reading of Butterworth is that a grand jury witness at most may be barred from
publicizing what actually transpired in the grand jury room (that is, questions that
were asked, exhibits that were referenced), and only for the life of that inquiry.118

114. See Hoffmann-Pugh v. Keenan, 338 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10th Cir. 2003) (involving the
housekeeper for the family of JonBenet Ramsey who sought declaratory judgment that a
Colorado Rule of Criminal Procedure was unconstitutional because it prohibited her from
writing a book about her experience before a grand jury during a murder investigation; the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the Colorado rule was narrower than the Florida statute at issue in
Butterworth because it prohibited only the disclosure of “grand jury testimony” unless and
until an indictment had been returned or a grand jury report had been issued).
115. Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 636–37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 632 (majority opinion). See id. at 635 (“After giving his testimony, respondent
believes he is no longer free to communicate this information since it relates to the ‘content,
gist or import’ of his testimony.”).
117. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 417 F.3d 18, 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2005) (regarding
a motion to compel an attorney witness to testify before a grand jury despite a claim of
attorney-client privilege, the government sought an order forbidding the attorney “from
disclosing to anyone . . . what he had been asked in the grand jury or other information
pertaining to ‘the subject matter’ of the grand jury inquiry”; the First Circuit determined that
it was “the permanency of the ban that most troubled the Supreme Court” in Butterworth, and
allowed the gag order on the condition that the attorney witness could petition the district court
for a termination of the order whenever the need for it disappeared); In re Catfish Antitrust
Litigation, 164 F.R.D. 191, 192–93 n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (imposing Rule 6(e) secrecy
obligations on witnesses would violate the First Amendment, “at least after the grand jury
proceedings have concluded”); cf. Doe v. Doe, 127 S.W.3d 728, 736 (Tenn. 2004) (explaining
that in the context of attorney disciplinary proceedings, “[t]o the extent that Disciplinary
Counsel serves a function analogous to a grand jury, we agree with the Attorney General that
confidentiality furthers a legitimate state interest in maintaining the integrity of pending
investigations. We do not believe, however, that this interest—even if it were considered to be
compelling—warrants a permanent ban on disclosure of information”).
118. In Butterworth, Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that a state may not prohibit a
witness from discussing facts within his independent knowledge (at least after the term of the
grand jury’s inquiry has ended), but he considered it “[q]uite a different question” whether the
state may prohibit a witness from revealing that he told the grand jury those very same facts.
Butterworth, 494 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). That fine distinction is contrary to the
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The latter approach seems to me to be most consistent with First Amendment values.
With respect to matters of public concern, a witness before the grand jury should never
be prohibited from talking to the media about facts within his own knowledge, even
during the pendency of grand jury proceedings, because political speech lies at the
heart of First Amendment protection.119 Prior to an indictment—which may or may
not be forthcoming—there are simply no countervailing Sixth Amendment rights to
a fair trial that must be balanced against the right to free speech.120 Empowering the
prosecutor or the court to silence a witness from talking about what they know would
allow law enforcement to squelch information about government misconduct simply
by serving a grand jury subpoena on those persons holding relevant information. In
hypothetical two, posed at the beginning of this Article, the mother of the senator’s
child has every right to tell (and to sell) her story about her extramarital affair with a
prominent public official, and the government cannot prevent her from doing so
simply by launching a grand jury inquiry.
The benefits to the public of enabling grand jury witnesses to talk to the press
during the pendency of a criminal investigation should not be underestimated, and

majority opinion, where Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the reporter was free to
publish information about “his own testimony” before the grand jury. Id. at 632 (majority
opinion). It also impresses me as an irrelevant one for constitutional purposes. Witnesses may
wish to make known to the media that they testified to a certain fact or set of facts before the
grand jury, in order to criticize government inaction. This occurred in the investigation into
the choking death of Eric Garner in Staten Island, New York; bystander Ramsey Orta told the
media that he had described the videotaped arrest of Garner in great detail to the grand jury,
but that they seemed disinterested. See Badia et al., supra note 21. This is legitimate public
discourse about a matter central to the conduct of government; that is, the independence of the
grand jury and its continued utility in our criminal justice system. I disagree with Justice
Scalia’s suggestion that there may be “quite good reasons” why the state would want such
information to be kept confidential, so that “grand jurors will not be intimidated in the
execution of their duties by fear of . . . criticism to which they cannot respond.” Butterworth,
494 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., concurring). First, the law is replete with instances in which a
government actor’s reply to speech is curtailed, even though the speaker has a First
Amendment right to make his point (the possession of classified information is but one
example). Second, the identity of grand jurors is not public information, but the identity of
trial jurors typically is. See Scott Sholder, “What’s In a Name?”: A Paradigm Shift from
Press-Enterprise to Time, Place and Manner Restrictions When Considering the Release of
Juror-Identifying Information in Criminal Trials, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 99–100 (2009)
(noting a trend in case law toward allowing press access to juror identities after the verdict).
Individual grand jurors are unlikely to be intimidated in the execution of their duties by the
public revelation of what evidence has been presented to them because they know that their
individual identities will not be revealed.
119. Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978). In Sheppard v.
Maxwell, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he press . . . guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism.” 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
120. See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1044 (1991) (stating that the timing
of pretrial disclosure is “crucial in the assessment of possible prejudice”); Patton v. Yount,
467 U.S. 1025, 1032–35 (1984) (finding that a lapse in time between pretrial publicity and
jury selection was relevant to determining whether the Sixth Amendment right to impartial
jury was violated).
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can be seen by the varying reactions to the police-involved killings in Ferguson,
Missouri and Staten Island, New York.121 In Ferguson, several eyewitnesses saw
Officer Darren Wilson being assaulted by Michael Brown in his police cruiser, and
heard Officer Wilson order Brown to stop before he fired the fatal shots.122 While
certainly not uncontroverted, these witnesses supported a theory of justified force,
yet they were not allowed to talk publicly during the grand jury proceedings. Citizens
in Ferguson thus did not have an accurate picture of the full state of the evidence and
felt frustrated by the lack of police accountability. Had witnesses been liberated from
the shackles of Missouri Revised Statute section 540.100,123 some versions of events
otherwise undisclosed may have countered, if not quieted, public criticism of the
police department—and maybe even have fended off violent riots and arson. In
Staten Island, by contrast, witnesses to the arrest of Eric Garner spoke frequently and
passionately about his violent arrest to the media during the investigation.124 This
open and honest discourse about Garner’s chokehold death may have led to an
environment where members of the public who were dissatisfied with law
enforcement at least felt that there was a nonviolent way for their voices to be heard.
Even on matters not so directly of public concern, subjects and witnesses in a
criminal investigation have a fundamental due process interest125 in sharing
information with each other. If a prosecutor can silence grand jury witnesses from
talking about the facts of the case by requesting gag orders as part of immunity

121. See Eric Garner Case: Why Weren’t Protests as Violent as in Ferguson?, CBS NEWS
(December 5, 2014, 7:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/eric-garner-case-why-werent
-protests-as-violent-as-in-ferguson/ [https://perma.cc/RR5X-HL6C] (describing New York
protests as “mostly peaceful”).
122. Alberto Cuadra, Lazaro Gamio, Kimbriell Kelly & Scott Higham, Chaos in a Police
Vehicle, WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special
/national/ferguson-reconstruction/ [https://perma.cc/A5ET-CX7X]; Eric Eckholm, Witnesses
Told Grand Jury That Michael Brown Charged at Darren Wilson, Prosecutor Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/witnesses-told-grand-jury
-that-michael-brown-charged-at-darren-wilson-prosecutor-says.html [https://perma.cc/6RSP
-UXXY]; Michael S. Schmidt, Matt Apuzzo & Julia Bosman, Police Officer in Ferguson Is
Said to Recount a Struggle, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014
/10/18/us/ferguson-case-officer-is-said-to-cite-struggle.html [https://perma.cc/26BC-Q7XJ].
123. MO. ANN. STAT. § 540.110 (West 2002).
124. Laura Ly, Can Cell Phones Stop Police Brutality?, CNN (Nov. 19, 2014, 5:31 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/us/police-cell-phone-videos/ [https://perma.cc/5H9H-5VE6];
Ashley Southall & Marc Santora, Remembering a Man Whose Death Made Him a Symbol of
a Divide, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/nyregion/mans
-dying-words-in-police-custody-become-rallying-cry-before-his-funeral.html [https://perma.cc
/DXK6-8ET5].
125. The “fundamental fairness” theory of due process prohibits a prosecutor from
obstructing the defendant’s access to evidence in a criminal case. See Arizona v. Youngblood,
488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (concerning the use of fundamental fairness as it relates to the police’s
failure to preserve items seized prior to arrest for forensic testing); see also Coppolino v.
Helpern, 266 F. Supp. 930, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“[A]s to interviewing a prospective
prosecution witness, our constitutional notions of fair play and due process dictate that defense
counsel be free from obstruction, whether it come from the prosecutor in the case or from a
state official of another state acting under color of law”).
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applications, they can frustrate the ability of subjects of the grand jury investigation
to collect evidence and conduct witness interviews of their own. Especially in the
context of corporate and white-collar crime, witnesses often need to enlist the help
of colleagues to recall events, to identify other persons with knowledge of a particular
subject, and to locate and preserve documents. Such collaboration is essential to the
defense counsel’s critical role during an investigation of presenting the prosecutor
with exculpatory evidence126 so that the grand jury can be allowed to perform its core
function as a “shield” 127 against unfounded prosecution.
The recent murder and racketeering charges stemming from a brawl between rival
motorcycle gangs at the Twin Peaks restaurant in Waco, Texas, illustrate the dangers
of the government attempting to overreach and silence ordinary witnesses to a
crime.128 After a melee that left nine people dead, the police arrested 177 suspects.129
Within days of their arrest, the district attorney moved for an order gagging “all
attorneys, their staffs, law enforcement officers, and witnesses who had provided
statements to law enforcement” from talking to the media about the altercation at
Twin Peaks.130 The judge presiding at a bail hearing granted the gag order proposed
by the State, which was drafted by McClennan County District Attorney Abel Renya,
the judge’s former law partner.131 Not coincidentally, the State’s gag request came
just one day after the State was served with a subpoena from an arrested suspect
requesting production of the restaurant’s videotape of the incident.132 The defense

126. See Coopersmith & Herd, supra note 55, at 37–38. The United States Attorneys’
Manual urges federal prosecutors to disclose to the grand jury “substantial evidence that
directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation.” OFFICE OF THE U.S. ATTORNEYS,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-11.233 (1997).
127. See Niki Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional
Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1266–67 (2006).
128. See Brief of Amici Curiae the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and 15
Media Organizations in Support of Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re
Clendennen, No. 10-15-00235-CR, 2015 BL 254662 (Tex. Crim. App. July 24, 2015); Tommy
Witherspoon, Judge Prevents Public Release of Twin Peaks Video, Issues Gag Order, WACO
TRIB. (June 30, 2015, 12:57 PM), http://www.wacotrib.com/news/twin-peaks-biker-shooting
/judge-prevents-public-release-of-twin-peaks-video-issues-gag/article_37bd518d-0c6b-52f8
-9374-d573e366f05b.html [https://perma.cc/PW8M-VVPQ].
129. Kelly McEvers, Texas Bikers Arrested After Waco Shootout Say They Are Innocent,
NPR (July 7, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/07/420824592/texas-bikers
-arrested-after-waco-shootout-say-they-are-innocent [https://perma.cc/7SZY-PXH7]; Michael
E. Miller, In the Wake of Deadly Waco Biker Shootout, Guns, Knives, Clubs, Chains, but Few
Answers, WASH. POST (May 21, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix
/wp/2015/05/21/in-the-wake-of-deadly-waco-biker-shootout-hundreds-of-weapons-but-few
-answers/ [https://perma.cc/RRY5-38Z7].
130. Order Prohibiting Attorneys, Law Enforcement and Witnesses from Discussing Case
with the Media, State v. Clendennen, No. 2015-1955-2 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 30, 2015).
131. Emily Schmall & Jim Vertuno, Biker Challenges Judge’s Gag Order in Criminal
Cases, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 1, 2015, 9:12 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article
/df7ac00d1ed0482981181e7a9fcdf5ea/biker-challenges-judges-gag-order-criminal-case
[https://perma.cc/MDT4-SFE6].
132. Order Prohibiting Attorneys, Law Enforcement and Witnesses from Discussing Case
with the Media, supra note 130; Lana Shadwick, Waco Judge Stops Twin Peaks Video Release,
Issues Gag Order, BREITBART (June 1, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/texas/2015
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speculates that the district attorney requested the gag order in part to prevent
dissemination of a videotape that the State had in its possession and would be using
to prepare the government’s case and present charges.133 The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth District ruled that this gag order was an abuse of discretion by the trial
court and a violation of petitioner’s free speech rights under applicable Texas
precedent.134 The gag order is now up for consideration by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals.135
After Butterworth, I suspect that at least some of the approaches taken by the
twelve states that extend their oath of grand jury secrecy to witnesses might not
withstand a First Amendment challenge, depending upon how precisely those
statutes are drawn and the exact nature of the speech prohibited.136 But my focus in
this Part has been on the federal system and the thirty-six states that do not include
witnesses in their oaths of grand jury secrecy. In those jurisdictions, courts should
decline an invitation to gag grand jury witnesses by supplemental order, for two
primary reasons: 1) the court does not have “inherent authority” to do so, and 2) there
are substantial doubts whether such a gag order would survive First Amendment
scrutiny. In extraordinary circumstances if a court ever believes that grand jury leaks
might jeopardize public safety or national security,137 the most that a court has the

/07/01/waco-judge-stops-twin-peaks-video-release-issues-gag-order/ [https://perma.cc
/J8UG-E73S].
133. See Witherspoon, supra note 128.
134. In re Clendennen, No. 10-15-0023-CR, 2015 BL 254662, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug.
7, 2015) (citing In re Graves, 217 S.W.3d 744 (Tex. App. 2007).
135. Order Granting Relator’s Motion to Stay, State v. Clendennen, No. WR-83, 719-01
(Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 13, 2015).
136. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 35-34-2-4(i) (2015) (“Grand jury proceedings shall be
secret, and no person present during a grand jury proceeding may, except in the lawful
discharge of his duties or upon written order of the court impaneling the grand jury or the court
trying the case on indictment presented by the grand jury, disclose: (1) the nature or substance
of any grand jury testimony; or (2) any decision, result, or other matter attending the grand
jury proceeding.”) (emphasis added), with N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-10.1-30(4) (2006) (“A
witness may not disclose any matter about which the witness is interrogated, or any
proceedings of the grand jury had in the witness’s presence, except to the witness’s attorney
or when so directed by the court, until an indictment is filed and the accused person is in
custody.”) (emphasis added).
137. Although a discussion of national-security investigations is beyond the scope of this
Article, my recommendations in this Article are unlikely to hinder counterterrorism
investigations because federal statutes contain quite specific rules pertaining to secrecy in the
national security context that are broader than Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). For a
comprehensive analysis of the wide variety of tools available to the government to keep the
nature, scope, and content of national-security investigations confidential, see Nathan
Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 ALA. L. REV. 811, 838–65
(2007). For example, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) allows the government
to conduct electronic surveillance, employ pen registers, seize physical evidence, and demand
business records upon approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. 50 U.S.C. §§
1801–1861 (2012). All four FISA subchapters contain secrecy requirements that impose
confidentiality obligations upon the recipients of those subpoenas or court orders. Sales, supra
at 871. The FBI also has the power to issue “National Security Letters” under the USA Patriot
Act to obtain records of third-party providers regarding stored electronic communications and
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power to do is to order the witness not to reveal to anyone what actually transpired
in the grand jury room (that is, specific questions that were asked by the prosecutor
or by a grand juror). A trial court may never order a grand jury witness not to discuss
with others or with the media facts that the witness disclosed to the grand jury that
were known by him or her independently of the grand jury investigation.
CONCLUSION
One important but often overlooked issue in the grand jury transparency debate is
the ability of witnesses to talk to each other and to the media about the contents of
their testimony. Witnesses often mistakenly conclude that the shroud of grand jury
secrecy extends to them when in most jurisdictions it simply does not. Prosecutors
sometimes seek to capitalize on this ignorance by affirmatively instructing the
witness to remain silent, either informally in their instructions to the witness or more
formally in a written plea agreement or judicial immunity application. Counsel
representing witnesses before the grand jury should push back against such efforts,
on the grounds that they offend the Rules of Professional Conduct, the intent behind
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the First Amendment.

financial transactions. See 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681u, 1681v (2012); 18
U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). The government may order recipients of a National Security Letter to
keep the receipt and content of the letter private whenever an FBI Director or his designee
certifies that disclosure may result in a national security threat or damage an ongoing
investigation. See Michael German, Michelle Richardson, Valerie Caproni & Steven Siegel,
National Security Letters: Building Blocks for Investigations or Intrusive Tools?, A.B.A. J.
(Sept. 1, 2012, 10:10 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/national_security
_letters_building_blocks_for_investigations_or_intrusive_t/ [https://perma.cc/3LX8-9Z92].
One interesting development for the purposes of this Article is that two federal courts have
ruled that the nondisclosure provisions of the National Security Letter statutes offend the First
Amendment. Compare Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 883 (2d Cir. 2008) (enjoining the
government from enforcing those provisions of the National Security Letter statutes that
placed the burden on the recipient to contest nondisclosure order, and that allowed government
to meet its burden in said judicial proceedings through “conclusive” certification by senior
government official), with In re National Security Letter, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1081 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (finding nondisclosure provisions unconstitutional and nonseverable, enjoining
issuance of National Security Letters altogether), appeal filed. These two National Security
Letter decisions strongly support my argument: if a witness “gag” order fails to promote a
compelling state interest in the national security context, it is highly unlikely to survive First
Amendment scrutiny in a routine criminal investigation, especially where the witness is a fact
witness rather than a third-party record holder.

